Dear Sirs and Madams,
There is a prevailing argument amongst western scholars of Korean history that the basis for rapid industrial growth in Korea lies in the foundations established by Imperial Japan. To a Korean this is a disturbing conclusion which attaches some implicit value to the experience of brutal colonialization. I will immediately dispense brief counterarguments against this ghastly supposition.
Comparison of the industrial output of Korea between 1910 and 1945 reveals an incredible growth rate of the industry under the colonial administration. Agricultural production doubled while profits from mining and manufacturing rose from 29 million yen in 1910 to 498 million yen in 1940. Despite the veneer of increased production, by 1940 Koreans held only 11% of the total capital in finance. The colonial administration designed this extreme economic inequality by heavily subsidizing Japanese corporations competing against local Korean businesses. For example, the Japanese government guaranteed Mitsubishi an annual 5000 yen subsidy while blocking competitive Korean businesses from entering the Japanese market by placing strict tariffs. The Japanese colonial apparatus never intended to create a free market society where colonial subjects would have been allowed a fair chance to gain wealth, but instead used the economy as an instrument of state policy, restraining Koreans from financial participation.
Historian Dennis McNamara argues that Japanese contribution to Korean capitalism remains substantial compared to other colonial cases because the heavy industry developed to satisfy war time demands of chemicals and munitions for the Pacific War “modified the traditional pattern of primary goods exports and manufactured imports” (McNamara). However, the demand for munitions and chemicals depended entirely on the continuation of war which resulted in the extraction of able bodied young men and women from the labor pool and diminished ties with potential export markets such as the United States that faced increasing domestic pressure to curtail ties with Japan after the Mukden Incident. Empires of the early 20th century required expansion and war for its political and financial security. The central directive of the Japanese colonial administration had been to establish Korea as a forward base for expansion into Manchuria and China, not to develop the industry for a sustainable and healthy economy.
Carter Eckert, another historian, noted that the rise of former peasants into social positions and was unimaginable before Japanese colonialization. While rags to riches stories did exist, class mobility remained mostly restricted. The Japanese left in place the local hierarchy and land owners who facilitated their control and impeded the peasantry from taking a greater role in commerce. Prominent pioneers of Korean finance and industry such as Min Tae-sik, Pak Hung-sik, and Kim Yon-su all originated from aristocratic or land owning families. The restrictions on class mobility became clearer with the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Military rationing of industrial raw materials forced small businesses run by former peasants to close, widening the gap between the haves and the have nots.
Korea before Japanese colonization desperately needed reforms in its economic, social, and political systems. However, to argue that the Japanese colonial apparatus established a sustainable system of production seems as redundant as forwarding any claim on a colonial power’s contribution to the “modernizing” of its occupied peoples. A little more than a century before the annexation of Korea, pre-revolutionary Haiti stood as the wealthiest territory in the Americas; however, a society where the vast majority of the population toil as slaves for the enormous profits of a minority hardly constitutes a truly prosperous society. The fact of the matter remains that the impetus for colonial development relied on eternal vigilance, inequality, and violence within and abroad.
If the above arguments were not strong enough, here is a final point. Whatever physical infrastructure the Japanese left behind in Korea was obliterated in the Korea War. Therefore, it is truly difficult to say if any of the pre-war industries actually survived in form to contribute to the Miracle on the Han.
Case in point.
Best,
Yong Kwon
There is a prevailing argument amongst western scholars of Korean history that the basis for rapid industrial growth in Korea lies in the foundations established by Imperial Japan. To a Korean this is a disturbing conclusion which attaches some implicit value to the experience of brutal colonialization. I will immediately dispense brief counterarguments against this ghastly supposition.
Comparison of the industrial output of Korea between 1910 and 1945 reveals an incredible growth rate of the industry under the colonial administration. Agricultural production doubled while profits from mining and manufacturing rose from 29 million yen in 1910 to 498 million yen in 1940. Despite the veneer of increased production, by 1940 Koreans held only 11% of the total capital in finance. The colonial administration designed this extreme economic inequality by heavily subsidizing Japanese corporations competing against local Korean businesses. For example, the Japanese government guaranteed Mitsubishi an annual 5000 yen subsidy while blocking competitive Korean businesses from entering the Japanese market by placing strict tariffs. The Japanese colonial apparatus never intended to create a free market society where colonial subjects would have been allowed a fair chance to gain wealth, but instead used the economy as an instrument of state policy, restraining Koreans from financial participation.
Historian Dennis McNamara argues that Japanese contribution to Korean capitalism remains substantial compared to other colonial cases because the heavy industry developed to satisfy war time demands of chemicals and munitions for the Pacific War “modified the traditional pattern of primary goods exports and manufactured imports” (McNamara). However, the demand for munitions and chemicals depended entirely on the continuation of war which resulted in the extraction of able bodied young men and women from the labor pool and diminished ties with potential export markets such as the United States that faced increasing domestic pressure to curtail ties with Japan after the Mukden Incident. Empires of the early 20th century required expansion and war for its political and financial security. The central directive of the Japanese colonial administration had been to establish Korea as a forward base for expansion into Manchuria and China, not to develop the industry for a sustainable and healthy economy.
Carter Eckert, another historian, noted that the rise of former peasants into social positions and was unimaginable before Japanese colonialization. While rags to riches stories did exist, class mobility remained mostly restricted. The Japanese left in place the local hierarchy and land owners who facilitated their control and impeded the peasantry from taking a greater role in commerce. Prominent pioneers of Korean finance and industry such as Min Tae-sik, Pak Hung-sik, and Kim Yon-su all originated from aristocratic or land owning families. The restrictions on class mobility became clearer with the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Military rationing of industrial raw materials forced small businesses run by former peasants to close, widening the gap between the haves and the have nots.
Korea before Japanese colonization desperately needed reforms in its economic, social, and political systems. However, to argue that the Japanese colonial apparatus established a sustainable system of production seems as redundant as forwarding any claim on a colonial power’s contribution to the “modernizing” of its occupied peoples. A little more than a century before the annexation of Korea, pre-revolutionary Haiti stood as the wealthiest territory in the Americas; however, a society where the vast majority of the population toil as slaves for the enormous profits of a minority hardly constitutes a truly prosperous society. The fact of the matter remains that the impetus for colonial development relied on eternal vigilance, inequality, and violence within and abroad.
If the above arguments were not strong enough, here is a final point. Whatever physical infrastructure the Japanese left behind in Korea was obliterated in the Korea War. Therefore, it is truly difficult to say if any of the pre-war industries actually survived in form to contribute to the Miracle on the Han.
Case in point.
Best,
Yong Kwon
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